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“Doing” Gender in Context: Household 
Bargaining and Risk of Divorce in Germany 
and the United States1 
Lynn Prince Cooke 
University of Queensland 
Gender relations remain embedded in their sociopolitical context. 
Compared here using event-history analysis is how household di­
visions of paid and unpaid labor affect marital stability in the former 
West Germany, where policy reinforced male breadwinner families, 
and the United States, where policy remains silent regarding the 
private sphere. In Germany, any moves away from separate gen­
dered spheres in terms of either wives’ relative earnings or husbands’ 
relative participation in housework increase the risk of divorce. In 
the United States, however, the more stable couples are those that 
adapt by displaying greater gender equity. These results highlight 
that policy shapes how gender gets done in the intimate sphere, and 
that reinforcement of a gendered division of labor may be detri­
mental to marital stability. 
A growing body of evidence indicates that the rules of economic exchange 
do not predict who does the housework once wives’ relative earnings 
exceed their husbands’. Although the division of housework tends to be­
come more equitable as wives’ relative household earnings increase from 
none to about half, it then reverts to a more traditional division as wives 
become the primary breadwinner (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Green­
1 Earlier versions of these analyses were presented at the International Sociological 
Association RC28 semiannual meeting in Neuchatel, Switzerland, May 7–9, 2004, and 
the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in Atlanta, August 16– 
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stein 2000). This latter phenomenon has been attributed to couples’ “do­
ing” gender in their marital relationship (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994). 
By doing gender, people actively manage social interactions in light of 
normative expectations (Fenstermaker Berk 1985; West and Zimmerman 
1987). The division of housework in particular reﬂects the “material em­
bodiment of wifely and husbandly roles, and derivatively, of womanly 
and manly conduct” (West and Zimmerman 1987, p. 144). Consequently, 
housework produces both a material and symbolic product of marriage 
so that what would seem the fairest division under the rules of exchange 
does not necessarily occur within the home (Fenstermaker Berk 1985; see 
also Hochschild 1989). 
The ﬁrst contribution of this article is to turn attention to the “So what?” 
If the division of housework reﬂects couples’ negotiation of intimate life, 
what is the effect of these negotiations on marital stability? To date re­
search has focused on the effects of the division of paid labor on marital 
stability; little is known about effects resulting from the division of unpaid 
labor. Two schools of thought theorize the impact of the household division 
of labor on marital stability, and these offer competing hypotheses. The 
ﬁrst is that gender specialization beneﬁts family solidarity because it in­
creases couples’ mutual dependence (Becker 1981; Parsons 1942, 1953). 
Under this specialization and trading model (Oppenheimer 1997), 
women’s employment poses a threat to the beneﬁts of specialization be­
cause it reduces women’s economic dependence upon men, in turn pre­
dicting a greater risk of divorce (Becker 1985). By extension, although 
never assessed, husbands’ greater domestic participation also threatens 
the mutual dependence created by specialization, and so should also in­
crease the risk of divorce. 
The second school of thought evolves from social exchange and bar­
gaining models (Blau 1960; England and Farkas 1986; McElroy and Hor­
ney 1981). Couples negotiate the division of paid and unpaid labor to a 
unique equitable distribution within the family based on relative wages, 
preferences, and so on. These models hold that alternatives to the marriage 
are important determinants of relative bargaining power that inﬂuence 
possible divisions (McElroy and Horney 1981). In these models, women’s 
employment and economic independence more generally increase their 
ability to invoke a credible threat of divorce if a more favorable division 
of domestic labor cannot be negotiated. Under this dynamic, husbands’ 
greater domestic participation should decrease the risk of divorce (Breen 
and Cooke 2005). 
To explore which of these competing hypotheses reﬂects reality, we ﬁrst 
assess whether husbands’ share of unpaid, domestic tasks increases the 
risk of divorce as would be predicted by the specialization and trading 
model, or decreases the risk of divorce as predicted by social exchange 
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and bargaining models. We then explore the effect of any compensatory 
actions that suggest doing gender in the domestic sphere as women’s 
relative earnings rise, which falls outside of either model’s prediction. 
With the arguments to date, however, we are left with another set of 
competing hypotheses. If doing gender in this way represents a process 
by which dual-earning couples neutralize gender deviance (Bittman et al. 
2003; Greenstein 2000), and doing so is beneﬁcial to marital relations, it 
should decrease the risk of divorce. If, instead, wives taking on a greater 
share of domestic tasks as their relative earnings exceed their husbands’ 
reﬂects a display of relative gender power running counter to what is 
perceived as fair under notions of distributive justice, it should increase 
the risk of divorce. 
Doing gender, however, is an active process reﬂecting the institutional 
shaping of gender relations. Structural and ideological incompatibilities 
between the home and workplace limit women’s ability to achieve equity 
in either sphere (Ferree 1990; Hartmann 1981). The degree to which 
institutional factors reinforce more or less traditional divisions of labor 
varies across industrialized societies (Lewis 1992). The second contribution 
of this article is to explore how household divisions of labor and any 
associated risks of divorce vary in the sociopolitical context. To do so, I 
use the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the German 
SocioEconomic Panel to compare the risk of divorce among couples as 
they marry and negotiate the household division of labor in the United 
States, where there is less institutional support for the traditional male 
breadwinner model, with West Germany, where there has been strong 
institutional support for the traditional gendered division of labor. Panel 
data are used, as they are most suitable for assessing the dynamic process 
of couple negotiations of the division of labor (Kalleberg and Rosenfeld 
1990) as well as the risk of life transitions such as divorce (Allison 1984). 
THE HOUSEHOLD DIVISION OF LABOR IN CONTEXT 
The desirability of the gendered division of labor—when husbands spe­
cialize in economic production while wives specialize in domestic 
(re)production—is judged differently depending upon whether one is the­
orizing about household versus individual outcomes. At the household 
level, the specialization and trading model (Oppenheimer 1997) holds that 
mutual dependence (Becker 1981) and family solidarity (Parsons 1953) 
are created when partners specialize, then trade the fruits of their spe­
cialties. When women are instead economically independent, marriage is 
less advantageous to them, and divorce rates are predicted to rise (Becker 
1981, 1985). 
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Empirical evidence of the direct relationship between women’s em­
ployment and marital instability, however, is mixed (see Rogers 2004). 
While some studies report a positive relationship (Becker, Landes, and 
Michael 1977; Brines and Joyner 1999; Ruggles 1997; South 2001), others 
ﬁnd that the positive relationship stems from changes in the pool of avail­
able partners (Aberg 2003; South and Lloyd 1995) or only when the mar­
riage is an unhappy one (Schoen et al. 2002). Still other research ﬁnds no 
signiﬁcant relationship (Bumpass, Martin, and Sweet 1991; Hoffman and 
Duncan 1995; Greenstein 1990, 1995). Consequently, it is not clear that 
women’s participation in the employment sphere is directly harmful to 
family stability and raises questions about the desirability of specialization 
(see also Oppenheimer 1988, 1997). 
From an individual perspective, specialization is problematic because 
the mutual dependence is not a marker for equality within the marriage 
(Goldscheider and Waite 1991). As argued within the social exchange or 
bargaining literature, dominant power is held by the person who is less 
dependent on the relationship in terms of having attractive alternatives 
(Blau 1960; Emerson 1962; Thibaut and Kelley 1959), with economic 
resources a primary source of power (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Weber 1958). 
Economic resources are more transferable than an investment in a par­
ticular relationship and children, so a woman’s specialization in the do­
mestic sphere reduces her outside alternatives to a given marriage (En­
gland and Farkas 1986). In addition, having children by a prior 
relationship is not advantageous to women seeking a new partner, es­
pecially if she requires that the new partner contribute his own resources 
to support these children. 
Consequently, the gendered division of labor ex ante favors husbands 
by giving them direct access to economic resources and superior alter­
natives to the marriage (England 1993). This enables them to negotiate 
solutions more favorable to themselves in terms of leisure time and their 
assistance with the amount or type of domestic tasks (Blau, Ferber, and 
Winkler 2002). There is also evidence that husbands expropriate more of 
the family economic resources for their own behalf (Blau et al. 2002), 
even those transfers speciﬁcally intended for other family members (Lund­
berg, Pollak, and Wales 1997). Further, a wife’s economic dependency 
leaves her vulnerable to a husband’s exploitation or abuse and, in the 
case of his death or desertion, poverty. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that as female wage rates rose after World 
War II, women joined the labor force in increasing numbers. About two-
thirds of women ages 15 to 64 across industrialized countries are in the 
labor force, although this rate varies from a low of less than 50% in 
southern European countries to a high of over 75% in Scandinavian 
countries (OECD 2000), with married women’s participation rates even 
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more varied (Jaumotte 2003). Under social exchange and bargaining mod­
els, the rising female employment was expected to lead to a revolution in 
the gendered division of domestic labor. In the late 1980s, however, Hochs­
child (1989) deemed the revolution “stalled.” Controlling for employment 
or earnings, time in domestic tasks changes as women and men move 
into and out of different familial states, with women increasing their 
housework hours when in unions while men decrease theirs (Gupta 1999a; 
South and Spitze 1994). 
To explain the anomaly, Fenstermaker Berk (1985) argues that the home 
is a “gender factory,” producing and reproducing intimate identities of 
masculinity and femininity. “Simultaneously, members ‘do’ gender, as they 
‘do’ housework and child care, and what [has] been called the division 
of labor . . . is the mechanism by which both the material and symbolic 
products of the household are realized” (Fenstermaker Berk 1985, p. 201). 
The home is just one arena in which we do gender, but it is the primary 
site of our intimate identities and therefore an important one. 
The concept of “doing” gender reﬂects that we are not simply born into 
a sex or gender identity or merely functioning in a gender role, but that 
gender is a “routine, methodical, and recurring accomplishment” (West 
and Zimmerman 1987, p. 126). Social interactions provide the context for 
reinforcing the proscribed essentialness of gender. These interactions do 
not express natural differences between women and men, but produce 
the differences (Goffman 1977). By doing gender, we reﬂect the social 
structure as well as derive relative power consequences of gender category 
membership (West and Zimmerman 1987). In this way, as individual 
members of society, we actively replicate gender hierarchies in social 
interactions. 
Historically, the division of labor within industrialized societies pro­
duces and reproduces gender hierarchies (Ferree 1990; Hartmann 1981). 
Early in industrialization, policies supporting family wages for men and 
marriage bars for women, along with protective legislation limiting 
women’s work activities, locations, and hours, all further reinforced men’s 
dominance in paid labor (Goldin 1990; Lewis 1992). Despite the elimi­
nation of such explicitly gendered labor force policies across many coun­
tries, gender differences in employment persist, including both horizontal 
and vertical segregation and a gender wage gap even after controlling for 
education and experience (Blau et al. 2002; Harkness and Waldfogel 1999). 
One argument is that women’s continued responsibility for the domestic 
sphere inhibits their ability to attain employment equality with men (Fer­
ree 1990; Hartmann 1981; Hobson 1990). So as an interlocking system, 
the gendered nature of both paid and unpaid work blocks the ability to 
achieve gender equality in either domain (Ferree 1990, p. 874). 
As evidence, contrary to the “logic of the pocketbook” (Hochschild 
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1989), as women’s earnings exceed those of men, an even more traditional 
division of domestic tasks emerges (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; 
Fenstermaker Berk 1985; Greenstein 2000; Hochschild 1989). Brines 
(1994) ﬁnds that as U.S. wives’ relative earnings increase, they decrease 
their hours of domestic tasks in a linear fashion predicted under exchange 
models, but their husbands decrease their own as well. She interprets this 
as men’s need for “gender display,” with manhood an achieved status put 
under threat when wives take on the traditionally male economic role in 
the household. Greenstein (2000) ﬁnds similar results when using absolute 
hours of housework, but when using proportional measures, ﬁnds that 
both husbands and wives adjust their behavior to more normative di­
visions. He claims that proportional measures are more appropriate, as 
they “are more likely to capture the distributive justice or equity aspects 
of the division of housework” (Greenstein 2000, p. 325). 
Bittman et al. (2003) also ﬁnd that Australian and U.S. couples do 
gender in terms of compensating behavior in the division of domestic 
tasks as wives’ earnings exceed their husbands’, but in Australia, it is the 
women who compensate by increasing their domestic hours. The authors 
offer the explanation that Australian women’s corrective response is larger 
than that found for U.S. women because institutional differences make 
women’s primary breadwinning more anomalous in Australia than in the 
United States. The “family wage” central to strong male breadwinner 
nation-states was part of Australian governmental wage setting 
(O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999). 
Consequently, while “doing” gender occurs in interactions at the indi­
vidual level, its patois derives from the institutional setting, with correc­
tive action more pronounced where more traditional gender roles have 
been reinforced by policy. This proposition that policy alters the ways in 
which couples negotiate the household division of labor bears elaboration 
and further testing. 
Doing Gender in Its Policy Context 
Jane Lewis (1992) suggests classifying countries as ranging from “strong” 
to “weak” male breadwinner states by the extent to which policy reinforces 
men’s preferential access to employment and women’s responsibility for 
the unpaid care work in the private sphere. Germany is the ideal-typical 
strong male breadwinner state (Lewis 1992). At the end of World War II, 
West Germany founded a new political system based on “natural law” 
(Naturrecht), stemming from a “pre-political” patriarchal order ordained 
by God (Moeller 1993). Strengthening the patriarchal family as an insti­
tution dominated West German federal policy under Konrad Adenauer 
during the 1950s and 1960s, with social provisions favoring male bread­
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winners with nonworking wives (Gerhard 1992; Ostner 1992; Zimmerman 
1993). Income splitting for taxation purposes, particularly beneﬁcial to 
high-income, single-earner families, was introduced in 1958. In 1961, 
mothers were deemed the only satisfactory educators of their children, so 
that schools were subsequently set up to ﬁnish after two hours on one 
day, six the next, and were closed over the lunch hour (Ostner 1993; von 
Oertzen 1999). A 1966 federal report highlighted gender disparities in 
educational attainment and concluded that women were failing to exploit 
fully their right of education—to the detriment of the education of the 
next generation (von Oertzen 1999). Until 1977, domestic responsibilities 
continued to be recognized as West German women’s legal duty (Hantrais 
1994). 
West German women’s educational attainment and employment lagged 
during this time. Fewer West German women than men graduated from 
the highest secondary school tracks and went on to university, and there 
are clear gender differences in the type of occupational training selected 
(Geschka 1990). At the time of economic uniﬁcation with East Germany 
in 1990, only 44% of West German married women were employed, and 
only half of this percentage were employed full-time (Ostner 1993). 
In contrast, U.S. policy since World War II has primarily reﬂected the 
liberal tradition and addressed women’s ability to compete in the labor 
market.2 Employment, training, and education discrimination on the basis 
of gender became illegal under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
During the 1970s, laws expanded enforcement of this legislation, pro­
moting equal educational opportunities and job training. U.S. women’s 
secondary completion rates have historically been higher than those of 
their male counterparts. Since 1982, more bachelor’s degrees have been 
conferred on U.S. women than men, women earn more associate and 
master’s degrees than men, and they are coming close to parity in ﬁrst-
professional and doctoral degrees (U.S. Department of Education 2000). 
These policies also encourage U.S. women’s labor force participation, with 
two-thirds of U.S. married women with children ages 6 to 17 employed, 
as are almost 60% of married women with children under the age of 6 
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2004). Unlike West German policy, U.S. 
policy remains silent regarding who is responsible for the private sphere 
(Leibfried and Ostner 1991). This is not to say that gender equality is a 
given with liberal market economies (see Hartmann 1981), just that a 
gendered division of domestic labor is not speciﬁcally reinforced by U.S. 
policy. 
2 Feminist or reformer concerns for women as mothers also play a key role in U.S. 
policy, particularly at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Orloff 
(1996) provides a review of the scholarship documenting this era. 
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From these divergent policy paths, the institutional framework deﬁning 
where gender should be “done” vis-a`-vis the division of labor varies across 
the countries. Not surprisingly, on attitudinal surveys West Germans ex­
press greater support for the traditional gendered division of labor than 
do U.S. persons (Breen and Cooke 2005). Analyzed here is the extent to 
which these more traditional attitudes translate into more traditional 
household divisions of labor within West German as compared with U.S. 
couples, and whether different divisions of labor alter the risk of divorce 
for couples in either country. 
THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND MARITAL STABILITY 
The specialization and trading model relates women’s rising employment 
to rising risk of divorce but has not explicitly predicted effects of husbands’ 
greater domestic contribution. If specialization creates an essential mutual 
dependence, it can be deduced within this framework that men’s increas­
ing domestic contribution undermines specialization and so would also 
be predicted to increase the risk of divorce. 
In contrast, social exchange (Blau 1960), contract (England and Farkas 
1986), and game theoretic bargaining models (Manser and Brown 1980; 
McElroy and Horney 1981) view the observed household division of labor 
as the result of couple negotiations that reﬂect each person’s relative power 
and resources. Divorce is not the given outcome but forms the lower bound 
of an acceptable outcome, a person’s threat point, or BATNA (best al­
ternative to a negotiated agreement). If women ﬁnd themselves unable to 
negotiate a favorable division of domestic tasks, economically independent 
women are able to then leave the marriage. As more women gain economic 
independence, more are able to threaten divorce (Breen and Cooke 2005). 
This suggests that the higher divorce rates since World War II are not 
reﬂecting just effects of women’s rising employment; they reﬂect men’s 
resistance to changing their domestic behavior in response to women’s 
rising employment. Lennon and Rosenfeld (1994) ﬁnd that women with 
more alternatives to the marriage perceive unequal divisions of domestic 
tasks as unfair, whereas women with fewer alternatives report greater 
acceptance of the situation. Schoen et al. (2002) ﬁnd that U.S. women’s 
employment only increases the risk of divorce when the marriage is an 
unhappy one. More than two decades ago, Huber and Spitze (1980) found 
that while wives’ thoughts of divorce increase with their own employment, 
they decrease with husbands’ increasing housework contribution. To date, 
however, analyses of the effect of wives’ employment on divorce have 
not controlled for possible countervailing effects of husbands’ domestic 
contribution. If the social exchange and bargaining predictions are correct, 
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husbands’ greater share of domestic tasks should decrease the risk of 
divorce. 
It should be noted that Lundberg and Pollak (1993, 1994) question 
whether divorce is the true threat point in family bargaining. They argue 
that even if couples cannot reach agreement, there are still beneﬁts such 
as shared living economies and enjoyment of the children that make 
divorce a less desirable alternative. They suggest that failing agreement, 
couples ﬁrst revert to a noncooperative strategy reﬂecting the traditional 
roles under the gendered division of labor. The absence of cooperation in 
marriage, however, results in either a poorly maintained home or fewer 
children, since a woman will only produce what she can manage on her 
own (Lundberg and Pollak 1993). There is evidence of these dynamics 
across countries. Couples in which the husband contributes less to house­
work or childcare have a lower risk of second children in Germany (Cooke 
2004), Hungary, Sweden (Ola´h 2003), and, depending on wives’ employ­
ment status, the United States (Torr and Short 2004). Consequently, only 
the effects of the division of housework on likelihood of divorce shall be 
analyzed here. 
Neither the specialization and trading nor social exchange and bar­
gaining models offer predictions for the effects of compensating behavior 
on the risk of divorce. For this we link the hypothesized reasons for doing 
gender in the household division of labor to possible family effects. Bitt­
man et al. (2003) and Greenstein (2000) argue that the compensating 
behavior in the form of a woman’s greater domestic share when she is 
also the primary breadwinner neutralizes gender deviance in a marriage. 
If minimizing this deviance is essential not only to intimate identities but 
to relationship stability, doing gender in this way should decrease the risk 
of divorce. If, instead, the rules of exchange and distributive justice dom­
inate in successful couples, female breadwinners compensating by taking 
on a greater share of domestic tasks might be performing a stop-gap 
measure within an inherently unfair situation. If so, the risk of divorce 
should be higher in couples exhibiting the compensating division of do­
mestic tasks than in couples where there is gender equity. By gender equity 
we refer to when wives’ relative contribution to earnings is the same as 
husbands’ relative contribution to housework, ranging from zero, where 
wives contribute nothing to earnings and husbands contribute nothing to 
housework, to 100, indicating women are the breadwinners while hus­
bands assume all domestic tasks. 
The effects of the household divisions of paid and unpaid labor on 
couples’ risk of divorce are compared in the United States and the former 
West Germany to see whether they vary as policy support for the male 
breadwinner model has varied. For this to be a meaningful comparison, 
the propensity to divorce in each country must be similar, so we observe 
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differences in effects, not differences in overall likelihood of divorce. Dur­
ing the 1980s, the divorce rate in West Germany was just 30% as compared 
with the U.S. rate at nearly 50%, but the West German rate has been 
rising. More recent statistics suggest that the current incidence of divorce 
is quite similar in the two countries, at 49.1 divorces per 100 marriages 
in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau 2000) as compared with 46.0 
divorces per 100 marriages in uniﬁed Germany (EUROSTAT 2000).3 
As illustrated in ﬁgure 1, attitudes toward marriage and divorce are 
also highly similar in the two countries. The ﬁgure displays the mean 
reports by country for three questions from the 1994 International Social 
Survey Program that assess attitudes about marriage and divorce: (1) 
married people are generally happier than single people, (2) a bad marriage 
is better than being single, and (3) divorce is the best solution to a bad 
marriage. In both countries, the samples tend not to agree that married 
people are happier, strongly disagree that a bad marriage is preferable to 
being single, and moderately agree that divorce is the best solution to a 
bad marriage, with West Germans slightly more likely to agree than U.S. 
respondents. 
DATA 
Wives’ relative earnings, work hours, husbands’ share of domestic tasks, 
number of children, and the risk of divorce vary across the marital life 
course. The most suitable way to assess these dynamic relationships is 
with event-history analysis (Allison 1984; Yamaguchi 1991), which re­
quires longitudinal data. The German SocioEconomic Panel (GSOEP) 
and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) are selected for the 
analyses. 
The GSOEP is a longitudinal study of private German households 
where all household members over the age of 16 are interviewed annually 
for data on the preceding year. The ﬁrst wave occurred in 1984 with a 
representative sample of 12,290 people in 5,921 households in the former 
West Germany. In June 1990, sampling extended into the former East 
Germany, but East Germans shall not be included in this analysis as the 
male breadwinner model was not institutionally reinforced in that region. 
3 Part of the current divorce rate in uniﬁed Germany might be attributable to the 
higher historical rate in the former East Germany. Yet following the economic uncer­
tainty of uniﬁcation, East Germans were less likely for a time either to marry or divorce 
than were West Germans (Mu¨ nz and Ulrich 1995). The most recent statistics available 
suggest that the number of divorces as compared with number of marriages is now 
higher in the former West La¨nder than in the former East (http://www.statistik­
portal.de/Statistik-Portal/en/en_jb01_jahrtab3.asp). 
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Fig. 1.—West German (left column) and U.S. (right column) attitudes toward divorce. 
Based on 1994 International Social Survey Program data, reﬂecting mean country scores 
on the questions ranging from 1, strongly agree, to 5, strongly disagree. 
The constitution adopted by East Germany in 1949 enforced women’s 
right and obligation to work, supported by extensive policy provisions 
enabling women to combine work and having children (Moeller 1993; 
Ostner 1993; Zimmerman 1993). After uniﬁcation, economic constraints 
dramatically increased unemployment in East Germany and made East 
Germans less likely to make any family transition—into or out of marriage 
(Mu¨ nz and Ulrich 1995; Witte and Wagner 1995). Too few East German 
couples in the sample married (69) and divorced (21) during the obser­
vation window to conduct separate East German analyses. 
The PSID is a longitudinal study of U.S. individuals and the family 
units in which they reside, beginning in 1968 with a representative sample 
of 4,800 families in which the head only is normally interviewed. Although 
two thousand Latino households were added to the panel in 1990, they 
were subsequently dropped in 1995 and a new, much smaller immigrant 
sample added. Consequently, the only ethnic differentiation possible in 
the analysis here is when respondents are black. Historically, the rate of 
marital dissolution has been greater for black couples (Hoffman and Dun­
can 1995; Ruggles 1997). 
From each data set, we select couples marrying for the ﬁrst time be­
tween 1985 and 1995 for which there is at least one year of data following 
the marriage. These couples are followed through 1997 in the United 
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States and 2000 in Germany.4 The year 1985 is selected for the beginning 
of the observation window, as it is the second year of GSOEP data col­
lection. The same year is selected for the PSID data in order to follow 
couples in both countries during the same historical time period. Couples 
already married as of 1985 are excluded from analysis, since their inclusion 
biases results with marriages of longer duration and would not provide 
an accurate portrayal of family dynamics affecting the risk of divorce for 
all couples from the beginning of their marriage. For example, in Green-
stein’s (2000, p. 327) sample drawn from the National Survey of Families 
and Households, the average marriage duration was 17 years, whereas 
in 1990, the median U.S. ﬁrst-marriage duration was approximately eight 
years (National Center for Health Statistics 1995). 
In both panels, new members marrying into the sample can be assigned 
a weight of zero if they are not within the original sampling frame. For 
this reason, unweighted data are used for the analysis, although a com­
parison of weighted and unweighted sample descriptive statistics indicates 
that the two are highly similar. As a result, the analytical samples appear 
representative of German and U.S. couples marrying during the time 
period. 
The West German sample includes 559 couples, yielding an analytic 
sample of 4,483 couple-years, reduced to 3,524 due to listwise deletion of 
missing data primarily because information on a couple was not available 
in all years. Subsequent analysis using indicator variables for when data 
are missing indicates robustness of key effects. While 1,122 Caucasian 
and 368 black U.S. persons in the panel married during the observation 
window, many did not continue reporting in subsequent years, so the 
analytical sample is compsed of 506 couples (388 Caucasian and 118 
black), or 4,204 couple-years. When indicator variables are included for 
the missing data, key U.S. effects remain robust, although the signiﬁcance 
levels of some control variables change. Further, Lillard and Panis (1994) 
report that biases from sample attrition in the PSID when analyzing 
marital dissolution are generally mild. Also, demographics and the divi­
sion of labor derived from the PSID sample used here have been compared 
with cross sections of other more recently ﬁelded surveys (National Survey 
of Families and Households and the International Social Survey Program) 
and appear similarly representative. 
In the data set, each year of a couple’s marriage is a distinct observation, 
beginning with the ﬁrst year of marriage and concluding with either 
divorce or separation (which are not distinguished in this analysis given 
4 The PSID changed in 1997 to be conducted biannually, and the core sample was 
reduced by almost 30%. This created substantial missing data in the 1999 and inbe­
tween waves, so I decided to end the U.S. observation window in 1997. 
453 
American Journal of Sociology 
the variation in required waiting periods between separation and divorce), 
or the ﬁnal observation year in the panel. Constructing couple-years in 
this way automatically incorporates the time-varying aspects of the in­
dependent variables, but also violates the assumption that error terms 
not be correlated. Consequently, robust standard errors clustering on a 
unique couple identiﬁcation number are used. 
Variables 
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
analyses. These statistics are based on the couple-year ﬁles constructed 
for the event-history analyses, so the values of the time-varying variables 
represent averages over the observed years of marriage, not a snapshot 
of couples in any given year of marriage. 
Dependent variable.—The dependent variable is a binary variable in­
dicating whether a couple reports a divorce or separation in a given year. 
Once a divorce occurs, the couple is removed from analysis as they are 
no longer at risk of divorce. During the time period, 201 West German 
couples reported divorcing, and 223 U.S. couples (153 white and 90 black) 
reported divorcing. These aggregate ﬁgures suggest the divorce rate in 
Germany is higher than in the United States, when as noted earlier it is 
roughly similar in the two countries. The U.S. couples, however, are being 
followed for three years less than their German counterparts. As the event-
history models control for the effect of time on the risk of divorce, it will 
be possible to see whether the shorter U.S. observation window is the 
reason the observed U.S. sample divorce rates appear lower. 
Independent variables: Women’s employment.—In both panels, partic­
ipants are interviewed in a given year to ascertain information about their 
lives over the past 12 months. To ensure that causes of divorce are dif­
ferentiated from effects, values of the time-varying independent variables 
are lagged by one year. For example, if a woman is in the process of 
establishing her own household, her share of household earnings would 
rise, leading to the erroneous conclusion that her greater earnings caused 
the transition rather than resulted from it. Similarly, total household in­
come would decrease as dual-earner couples become single heads of house­
hold. In a troubled marriage, both partners may also reduce their time 
spent in household tasks as commitment to the marital home declines.5 
5 Comparing models using lagged versus unlagged independent variables, these sorts 
of differences are borne out (results available from the author). The substantive effect 
of U.S. wives’ relative earnings is larger when using unlagged variables, the effect of 
U.S. husbands’ share of housework is smaller and becomes statistically insigniﬁcant, 
and the prophylactic effect of total household income is much larger in both countries. 
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TABLE 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for West German and U.S. Couple

Independent and Control Variables Used in Event-History Models of

Divorce

West Germany United States 
Wife’s share of labor earnings (0–100) . . . . . . . . . . .  18.24  32.18  
(25.71) (24.12) 
Husband’s share of housework (0–100) . . . . . . . . . .  28.47  33.05  
(18.82) (24.58) 
Husband’s share of housework, squared . . . . . . . . .  1,165  1,697  
(1,340) (2,349) 
Wife’s weekly work hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13.63  28.15  
(18.15) (15.74) 
Wife’s weekly hours of housework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28.80  17.40  
(15.05) (14.78) 
Total household income (000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74.96  48.85  
(40.66) (44.84) 
Length of marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.39  4.57  
(3.43) (2.91) 
Husband’s weekly work hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39.74  41.59  
(14.47) (13.35) 
Wife’s  age  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30.25  30.23  
(5.13) (5.98) 
Number of children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.65  1.00  
(.94) (1.01) 
Wife out of labor force (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .58  .09  
Wife with university (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .10  .25  
Husband with university (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .19  .27  
Own home (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .35  .53  
Wife earns 1 50%#husband does ≤ 50% 
housework (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .07  .08  
Equitable division (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .04  .14  
Husband black (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  NA .24  
N couples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  522  1,490  
N couple-years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4,483  9,633  
Note.—These statistics are based on the event-history ﬁle for risk of divorce from year of marriage, 
representing valid couple-years in the observation window. Total household income is in the local currency. 
Most analyses of women’s employment on the likelihood of divorce 
assume that effects are linear by using a single continuous measure of 
women’s hours of employment or wages. It is possible, however, that 
being a housewife is a fundamentally different state than being a part-
or full-time working wife, particularly when comparing two countries 
with varying support for the traditional division of paid labor. The tra­
ditional family might also, in turn, carry different risks of divorce. To 
assess these effects, a binary variable is included for when the wife is out 
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of the labor force, against a referent of wives who are employed.6 If 
specialization is optimal for marital stability, these traditional couples 
should have a lower risk of divorce than dual-earner couples. Further, as 
the male breadwinner model has been reinforced more in Germany than 
in the United States, there should be more of these couples in Germany. 
As displayed in table 1, over half of West German wives are out of the 
labor force at some time during the observed years of marriage, as com­
pared with less than 10% of U.S. wives. 
To keep the metrics for the division of paid and unpaid labor com­
mensurate, a wife’s contribution to the family labor earnings is measured 
as a percentage (0–100) of the combined labor earnings of the wife and 
husband. This measure is perfectly correlated with the relative depen­
dency measure developed by Sorensen and McLanahan (1987) used in 
other analyses predicting the division of housework (Brines 1994; Green-
stein 2000). As shown in table 1, across all couples, the average household 
earnings contribution of U.S. wives is almost twice that of West German 
wives: 32% versus 18%, respectively. 
Wives’ hours of paid work are included to control for the time demands 
employment places on them that are theorized to alter the division of 
housework separately from the effects of their relative earnings (Blood 
and Wolfe 1960; South and Spitze 1994). Other things being equal, the 
more hours worked in the market, the fewer available for housework. 
Time constraints have proven important in predicting second births 
among German couples, an effect in addition to women’s earnings’ effects 
(Cooke 2004).7 
Division of housework.—The German data have variables for each 
partner’s reported weekly domestic hours, including housework, running 
errands, yard work and repairs, and child care, both during the week 
and the average hours on Saturday and on Sunday. The measure of house­
work used here is calculated as the time spent in all tasks with the ex­
ception of child care throughout the week. Child care is excluded as there 
is no similar measure within the PSID, but Cooke (2004) ﬁnds that German 
fathers’ relative contribution to child care proves insigniﬁcant in altering 
the risk of divorce. 
The PSID measure of housework is more limited in two ways. First, 
in contrast to the GSOEP, the PSID normally relies on a single primary 
6 Doing so proves important to ascertaining true effects, for when not differentiating 
for when women are out of the labor force, the effect of women’s relative earnings 
appears much smaller because it is camouﬂaging the higher risk of divorce among 
U.S. couples where the wife is out of the labor force.

7 The models were run with and without women’s work hours with no substantive or

signiﬁcant changes in other effects or the ﬁt of the model, but were left in for the 
theoretical reasons stated above. 
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adult—usually the male adult head if there is one—to provide information 
for all family members. Most evidence indicates that respondents over­
estimate their own housework time and underestimate the time contri­
bution of others (Shelton and John 1996), with Press and Townsley (1998) 
ﬁnding that husbands’ reports are less accurate than wives’. The extent 
of the possible U.S. husband-only reporting bias was analyzed by com­
paring a cross section of the longitudinal sample with a sample from one 
of the few PSID dual-respondent surveys (1985; results available from 
the author). That analysis indicates that while U.S. husbands do tend to 
underestimate their wives’ housework hours, the relative division of 
housework is fairly represented in the data once controlling for husbands’ 
reports of wives’ estimated weekly housework hours, so there are no 
signiﬁcant biases introduced in the model used here. 
The second limitation of the PSID is that it contains a single question 
asking the respondent to estimate how many hours are spent in “house­
work, excluding child care” each week. These data were used in the 
analyses by both Brines (1994) and Gupta (1999b) to reveal that at the 
extreme of a husband’s dependence on his wife, there is evidence of gender 
display. A single measure does not provide the detail of the German data, 
nor is it as rich as the series of questions asked of U.S. respondents on 
the National Survey of Families and Households and analyzed by Green-
stein (2000).8 None of these are as precise as the time diary data used by 
Bittman et al. (2003) in their analysis of Australian couples. But despite 
the wide range in the crudeness of the housework measure, results are 
remarkably consistent in terms of the extent of equity or compensatory 
behavior made evident with them. Consequently, concern for the quality 
of the housework measure appears more philosophical than applicable to 
the analysis. 
Husbands’ relative domestic participation is measured by dividing their 
weekly hours in housework by the combined household hours of the wife 
and husband, yielding their percentage share of domestic tasks ranging 
from 0 to 100. Also included is the square of this term to test for nonlin­
earity. If the squared term is positive and signiﬁcant, this indicates that 
husbands’ greater relative housework contribution at some point begins 
to increase the risk of divorce. A relative rather than absolute housework 
measure is used because of Greenstein’s (2000) evidence that compensating 
behavior is more evident when controlling for the relative rather than the 
absolute housework contribution of each. As also noted by Greenstein 
8 Although the National Survey of Families and Households collects more detailed 
information on household tasks for each family member, it has only conducted three 
waves several years apart (1987–88, 1992–94, and 2001–2002), which makes it less 
suitable than the PSID for conducting event-history analyses of divorce. 
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(2000), perceptions of fairness and distributive justice are related to the 
relative, not total amount. 
Women’s reported housework hours are included to control for the 
husband-only reporting bias in the PSID, as well as to control for when 
men’s share of housework is greater because women’s own housework 
hours decline when they are employed (Bianchi et al. 2000; Goldscheider 
and Waite 1991; Shelton and John 1996). Including this measure does not 
create a problem of multicollinearity with women’s hours of employment, 
however, because while employed women’s housework hours adjust to 
reﬂect competing time demands, the sharpest drop in housework hours 
since the 1960s has been among women who are out of the labor force 
(Gershuny 2000).9 
As evident in table 1, German wives spend more hours in housework 
on average than their U.S. counterparts (29 and 17 hours, respectively), 
although this could be due to the higher proportion of housewives in the 
German sample. Overall, the gendered division of housework appears 
roughly similar in the two countries, with husbands in each country per­
forming about one-third of the housework as has been found in other 
cross-national studies (Gershuny 2000). Husbands’ share of housework 
when wives are employed is less similar in the two countries, with U.S. 
husbands claiming to perform 44% as compared with German husbands 
performing 38%.10 
The above measures enable us to assess the economic exchange rela­
tionship between the household division of labor and risk of divorce 
predicted by bargaining models, but not whether compensatory behavior 
in the division of domestic tasks reduces the risk of divorce when the 
wife’s earnings exceed her husband’s. To assess this, an interaction in­
dicator variable is created for when wives’ relative earnings exceed 50% 
and husbands’ share of housework does not exceed 50%. In Germany, 
only 13% of wives earn more than their husbands, compared with 24% 
of U.S. wives. As can be seen in table 1, roughly half of these German 
female-breadwinning couples but just one-third of U.S. female-bread­
winning couples compensate for wives’ higher earnings by doing gender 
in this way (7% of the German and 8% of the U.S. samples). This is 
consistent with Bittman et al.’s (2003) Australian evidence that compen­
sating behavior in the domestic sphere is more common in strong male 
breadwinner states. 
9 Including women’s housework hours signiﬁcantly improves the ﬁt of the model, but 
does not substantively or signiﬁcantly alter effects of other variables.

10 Disability or poor health can also alter the household division of labor, but only one

or two of these younger ﬁrst-married couples report that one of the partners is in ill

health or is disabled in any given year.
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Control variables.—Controls for a wife’s age, number of children, total 
family income, home ownership, and college or university attainment are 
included in the models. According to models of assortative mating, people 
who are older at marriage are less likely to divorce because of a decrease 
in possible future marital partners (Becker et al. 1977). But culturally 
deﬁned bargaining disadvantages speciﬁc to women at older ages also 
exist. In many industrialized societies, youth and beauty prove valued 
characteristics of women and less important for the marriage prospects 
of men (England and Farkas 1986; Parsons 1942). Youth by deﬁnition 
disappears with age, so women lose their bargaining advantage over time 
regardless of any other factors. A variable is included here to control for 
women’s age. In both country samples, wives are, on average, 30 years 
old. 
Persons with higher-valued characteristics such as university education 
or wealth gain more from marriage and are therefore less likely to divorce 
net of other factors (Becker et al. 1977). The log of total household income 
is included to control for wealth of the family. Men’s education level is 
positively associated with their domestic participation (South and Spitze 
1994), whereas other studies ﬁnd no association (Kamo 1991; McAllister 
1990), or that the effect disappears once gender ideology is included (Kamo 
1994). Women’s greater educational attainment is associated with less time 
in domestic tasks (Blair and Lichter 1991; South and Spitze 1994), and 
is normally interpreted as an education effect on ideology. There is some 
U.S. evidence that the historical effect of wife’s greater educational at­
tainment lowering the risk of divorce is attenuating in younger cohorts 
(South 2001). A binary variable is created for women or men with college 
or university education, against a referent of less than college. 
In neoclassical economic models of marriage, children and home own­
ership represent accrued “marital goods,” so they predict a lower risk of 
divorce (Becker 1981). One might also argue that more stable couples are 
more willing to purchase a home together or have additional children, 
suggesting these might reﬂect a selection bias. Number of children in the 
family in a given year is entered into the models as a continuous variable. 
Home ownership is measured with a binary variable indicating when a 
couple owns their home, against a referent of renting. 
The risk of divorce can change as a function of time, irrespective of 
the independent variables, so a variable is included for years since mar­
riage. This also enables assessment of whether the observed country dif­
ferences in the incidence of divorce relative to sample size reported earlier 
are a function of time. A piecewise constant model including a series of 
year binary variables representing two to three, three to four, four to ﬁve, 
and ﬁve or more years from year of marriage was also tried, but any 
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signiﬁcant time effects in the respective countries proved to be essentially 
linear during the observed years of marriage. 
In the U.S. model, a binary variable is also included indicating when 
the husband is black, against a referent of when the husband is Caucasian. 
Racial marital homogamy is high: 95% of black women are married to 
black men and 99% of Caucasian women are married to Caucasian men. 
FINDINGS: THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND RISK OF DIVORCE 
The changes in the log odds that a West German or U.S. couple will 
divorce are presented in table 2. Discussion focuses on effects of the 
variables measuring the household division of labor. Two models are 
presented: one modeling the effects of the household division of labor 
using continuous measures, and the second adding the indicator term for 
when husbands perform half or less of domestic tasks when wives earn 
more than half of the couple’s labor income. 
Effects of the Household Division of Labor 
Results for model 1 indicate specialization is optimal for marital stability 
in West Germany, but not in the United States. While male breadwinner 
couples in both countries are more likely to divorce, the effect only reaches 
statistical signiﬁcance in the United States. Women’s rising relative earn­
ings also predict a rising risk of divorce, with the effect twice the mag­
nitude in the United States as in Germany. Each percentage point increase 
in a wife’s earnings as a percentage of her and her husband’s total labor 
earnings increases the log odds of divorce by 1% in West Germany and 
2% in the United States. Together these results suggest that the male 
breadwinner couples reinforced by policy are the most stable in West 
Germany, whereas dual-earner couples are the most stable in the United 
States provided a woman’s earnings do not exceed her husband’s. In the 
United States, being a male breadwinner couple increases the log odds 
of divorce by 0.83, comparable to the increase in risk when a wife is 
earning more than 41% of the family’s labor income ( 41 # 0.02 wife’s 
earnings effect). So reliance on a primary breadwinner of either gender 
among U.S. couples proves more precarious than when there are two 
more equal earners in the family. 
These relative employment effects, however, do not take into account 
possible countervailing effects of the division of housework, for which 
there are also marked country differences. German husbands’ increasing 
share of housework linearly increases the risk of divorce across the entire 
range (i.e., the quadratic term is insigniﬁcant). In contrast, U.S. husbands’ 
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Coefﬁcients from Discrete-Time Logistic Regression of Marital Dissolution from Year of Marriage 
West Germany United States 
Model 1 
Log Odds Robust SE 
Model 2 
Log Odds Robust SE 
Model 1 
Log Odds Robust SE 
Model 2 
Log Odds Robust SE 
Wife’s proportional earnings (0–100) . . . . . . .  .01*  .00  .01*  .01  .02**  .01  .02***  .01  
Wife out of labor force (0 p employed) . . . .62 .48 .60 .47 .83* .39 .99* .41 
Wife’s weekly work hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  �.00 .01 �.00 .01 �.01 .01 �.00 .01 
Husband’s % housework (0–100) . . . . . . . . . . .  .01*  .00  .01*  .01  �.04*** .01 �.04*** .01 
Husband’s % housework, squared . . . . . . . . .  .0003* .00 .0002 .00 
Wife’s weekly hours housework . . . . . . . . . . . .  .01  .01  .01  .01  �.03* .01 �.03* .01 
Number of children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  �.57*** .12 �.57*** .12 .11 .13 .09 .13 
Log of total household income . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  �.12 .09 �.12 .09 �.06 .11 �.05 .12 
Wife with college or university . . . . . . . . . . . . .  �.74† .43 �.70 .45 .13 .38 .20 .39 
Husband with college or university 
(0 p less than college or university) . . . . .  �.04 .30 �.00 .30 �1.38** .51 �1.38** .53 
Home ownership (0 p rent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  �.25 .22 �.23 .23 �1.23*** .31 �1.23*** .31 
Wife’s  age  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  �.01 .03 �.01 .03 �.03 .03 �.03 .03 
Years since marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .03  .04  .03  .04  .16**  .05  .16**  .05  
Black (U.S.) couple (0 p white)  . . . . . . . . . . . .  .30  .24  .31  .24  
Husband does ! 50% housework 
#wife earns 1 50%  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  �.01 .37 �2.25** .75 
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  �2.10 1.42 �2.10 1.42 �1.92 1.28 �2.20 1.40 
Log likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  �499 �499 �378 �369 
Wald x 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44.44**  44.48***  107.00*** 114.25*** 
N couple-years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3,524  3,524  4,204  4,204  
N couples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  559  559  506  506  
* , two-tailed tests. P ! .05 
** .P ! .01 
*** .P ! .001 
† .P ! .10 
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increasing housework contribution signiﬁcantly decreases the risk of di­
vorce to more than offset the effect of wives’ earnings. But the U.S. 
quadratic term is also signiﬁcant, so once U.S. husbands’ housework and 
wives’ earnings contributions exceed about 30%, the risk of divorce again 
begins to increase. Yet the net effect of husbands’ housework contributions 
equaling wives’ relative earnings still predicts lower log odds of divorce 
until both exceed 83%, which is an extremely nontraditional division of 
paid and unpaid labor. 
These effects are depicted in ﬁgure 2, which plots changes in the log 
odds of divorce for percentage point changes in wives’ relative earnings 
matched by identical changes in husbands’ share of housework (i.e., when 
wives contribute 10% of earnings, husbands’ share of housework is also 
10%; when wives contribute half to earnings, husbands are doing 50% 
of the housework, etc.), controlling for other signiﬁcant effects related to 
the division of labor. In other words, it plots changes in the predicted risk 
of divorce when couples negotiate a division of paid and unpaid labor 
reﬂecting distributive justice. At the origin, indicating male breadwinner 
couples, the single black diamond is the U.S. coefﬁcient, which is slightly 
above the gray circle indicating the German coefﬁcient for risk of divorce. 
Only here, comparing male breadwinner couples, is the relative risk of 
divorce lower in West Germany than in the United States. All other more 
egalitarian divisions of paid and unpaid labor increase the risk of divorce 
in West Germany whereas they reduce the risk of divorce in the United 
States. 
The second model in table 2 displays effects of compensatory domestic 
behavior attributed to couples doing gender to neutralize gender deviance 
when wives become the primary breadwinner (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 
1994). For the German couples, when wives perform a greater share of 
housework as their relative earnings exceed 50%, the negative effects 
associated with her greater relative earnings remain unaltered. For U.S. 
couples, this compensatory behavior at the extreme nontraditional divi­
sion of paid labor predicts a much lower risk of divorce. This suggests 
that there are positive effects for gender equity in the U.S. household 
division of labor until parity is reached, but neutralizing gender deviance 
has a prophylactic effect among those few women who are primary bread­
winners. Yet even under this compensating scenario, the remaining sig­
niﬁcance of the effect for husbands’ housework share indicates that these 
nontraditional couples are most stable when husbands perform some share 
of the housework.11 
11 From coefﬁcients in table 2, model 2: U.S. female breadwinner, husband contributes 
half to domestic tasks p [(100#0.02 wife’s earnings) � (�0.04#50 husband’s share 
of domestic) � (�0.03#13.50 employed wife’s mean housework hours) ��2.25 wives’ 
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Fig. 2.—Effect of earnings and housework exchange on U.S. and West German couples’ 
log odds of divorce. Calculated from coefﬁcients in table 2. The plots reﬂect the change in 
the log odds of divorce for percentage point changes in U.S. and German husbands’ share 
of housework matching wives’ relative earnings, controlling for signiﬁcant effects of hus­
bands’ housework share squared, male breadwinner couples, and wives’ mean hours of 
housework when employed or out of the labor force. 
In summary, German traditional male breadwinner families are pre­
dicted to be the most stable in that country. Any other divisions of paid 
and unpaid labor, even compensatory ones wherein a female breadwinner 
would retain responsibility for domestic tasks, increases the risk of divorce. 
In contrast, the rules of distributive justice appear to dominate among 
these ﬁrst-married U.S. couples until relative earnings approach a non­
traditional extreme. When wives’ relative earnings exceed their hus­
bands’, couples can reduce the risk of divorce if wives continue to perform 
a share of the housework. Further, when controlling for other signiﬁcant 
effects related to the division of labor, U.S. female breadwinner families 
where the woman does half the housework have a lower risk of divorce 
than German male breadwinner couples.12 
compensatory domestic share effect in that the husband does no more than half] p 
�2.66. Female breadwinner husband does nothing p [(100#0.02 wife’s earnings) � 
(�0.03#13.50 employed wife’s mean housework hours) � �2.25 interaction effect 
that the husband does no more than half of domestic tasks] p �0.66. 
12 From coefﬁcients in table 2, model 2: being a German male breadwinner couple 
predicts no net change in the risk of divorce. Computing for being a U.S. female 
breadwinner couple where the husband contributes half to domestic tasks yields a 
substantial decrease in the log odds of divorce ([(100#0.02 wife’s earnings) � 
(�0.04#50 husband’s share of domestic) � (�0.03#13.50 employed wife’s mean 
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Other Household Bargaining Effects 
The primary interest here is to compare effects of divisions of paid and 
unpaid labor on the risk of divorce in two countries with varying levels 
of institutional support for a male breadwinner model. These institutional 
differences, however, can manifest indirectly as well, reﬂecting other gen­
der differences in relative bargaining power. As noted earlier, if wives 
have not accrued work experience because they have been reliant on a 
male breadwinner, having children increases their dependence and in­
ability to leave the marriage. In West Germany, where the majority of 
households are male breadwinner households, the presence of children 
signiﬁcantly reduces the risk of divorce. The effect is linear, so each ad­
ditional German child further reduces the risk of divorce. In contrast, in 
the United States, where the vast majority of couples have two earners 
so that the vast majority of wives have some accrued work experience, 
the number of children does not alter the risk of divorce, a result also 
found by others (South 2001; Waite and Lillard 1991). 
Another difference in effects that might stem from the difference in the 
degree to which policy encourages couples’ economic interdependence 
versus wives’ dependence is that of home ownership. In the United States, 
the interest paid on home mortgages or loans secured with one’s home is 
tax deductible. This provides U.S. married women with an incentive to 
join the labor force, enabling the family to afford a larger home in a better 
neighborhood, which enhances a husband’s status as well. There are some 
deductions related to home ownership in Germany, but they are capped 
to a very modest level. As evident in table 2, home ownership reduces 
the log odds of divorce in both countries. The effect, however, is more 
than ﬁve times as great in the United States as in Germany (�1.23 vs. 
�0.23, respectively) and is only statistically signiﬁcant in the United States 
for these young couples. While other differences, such as the desirability 
of the rental sectors in the two countries, might account for part of this 
difference, it is also possible that the economic interdependence within 
couples created by the U.S. home mortgage tax provisions is a signiﬁcant 
factor. Future research might explore the effect of policies promoting 
greater couple economic interdependence, as an antidote to the negative 
effects found here of policy reinforcement of the traditional male bread­
winner model and women’s economic dependence. 
housework hours) � �2.25 interaction effect that the husband does no more than half 
of domestic tasks] p �2.66). In female breadwinner couples where the husband does 
no domestic tasks, the predicted net change in the risk of divorce is still less than zero 
([(100#0.02 wife’s earnings) � (�0.03#13.50 employed wife’s mean housework hours) 
� �2.25 interaction term] p �0.66). 
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DISCUSSION: DOING GENDER IN CONTEXT AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
MARITAL STABILITY 
Like a Russian doll, how we “do” gender is embedded in its historical 
sociopolitical context. Consequently, gender relations vary across insti­
tutional contexts, with the hierarchy evident in and replicated by the 
gendered division of labor in society (Hartmann 1981; Lewis 1992). Only 
recently, however, have policy inﬂuences and resultant divisions been 
compared across societies (Baxter 1997; Bittman et al. 2003; Davis and 
Greenstein 2004; Fuwa 2004), and none of these analyses compared effects 
of varying household divisions of paid and unpaid labor on marital sta­
bility. The specialization and trading model claims the traditional gen­
dered division of labor reinforced in some sociopolitical contexts is optimal 
for marital stability. Social exchange and bargaining models contend that 
women’s rising economic equality with men alters the credibility of threat 
points such as divorce through which more equitable distributions of 
household labor can be negotiated. Under these models, equitable divi­
sions of household paid and unpaid labor reﬂect distributive justice that 
should enhance marital stability. 
Here, the household division of labor and its effects on marital stability 
of couples ﬁrst married between 1985 and 1995 are compared in the United 
States and the former West Germany. U.S. liberal policy encourages female 
labor force participation while remaining silent on the private sphere, 
whereas West Germany implemented policies after World War II rein­
forcing women’s legal responsibility for the home and economic depen­
dence on a male breadwinner. With this historical reinforcement of the 
gendered division of labor, more West German couples report the wife is 
out of the labor force as compared with U.S. couples, where dual-earner 
couples are the norm. When a West German wife is employed, she per­
forms more domestic tasks, displaying more compensating domestic be­
havior for her nontraditional economic role than do U.S. wives. This is 
similar to evidence for couples in Australia, another strong male bread­
winner country relative to the United States (Bittman et al. 2003), and 
the variation in individual effects across countries found by Fuwa (2004). 
Together these ﬁndings highlight that it is not sufﬁcient to look at indi­
vidual resources in making predictions regarding the household division 
of labor; we must situate effects within the institutional setting, partic­
ularly the extent to which policy reinforces the gendered division of labor. 
This determines the extent to which a gendered division of labor is done 
within the intimate sphere of the home. 
As a counterargument, one might assert that other cultural differences 
explain both the traditional policies and effects found for West Germany 
as compared with the United States. Yet the former East Germany shares 
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a common cultural past with West Germany while the people were so­
cialized for two generations under divergent policies affecting the division 
of labor. After World War II, East Germany adopted a Stalinist consti­
tution that enforced women’s obligation to work (Moeller 1993). To sup­
port maternal employment, East Germany passed the 1950 Mother and 
Child Care and Women’s Rights Acts, establishing a network of public 
child care centers, kindergartens, and facilities for free school meals, and 
maternity leave and days off to tend sick children (Ostner 1993; Zim­
merman 1993). The state also mandated developing women’s skill cre­
dentials through education and vocational training, and a larger propor­
tion of East German women attended professional colleges and university 
than in West Germany (Budde 1999). Recent evidence indicates that even 
after economic reuniﬁcation, the division of housework is signiﬁcantly 
more egalitarian in the former East than in West Germany (Cooke 2004), 
and is similar to the division reported here for U.S. couples. These dif­
ferences within Germany suggest it is not just culture reﬂected in the 
divergent household divisions of labor in West Germany as compared 
with the United States, but also state policy. 
The institutional context shapes more than the household division of 
labor; it also varies the effects of different divisions of paid and unpaid 
labor on marital stability. Gender specialization proves optimal for marital 
stability in the country with institutional support for this model: West 
German male breadwinner couples are the most stable in that country, 
and any movement away from this in terms of wives’ relative earnings 
or husbands’ relative housework increases the risk of divorce. In contrast, 
equitable distributions of the household division of labor predicted under 
social exchange models appear optimal in the United States where policy 
remains silent on the private sphere and market effects meander their 
laissez-faire course. At the extremes, however, both U.S. male and female 
breadwinner couples are at greater risk of divorce. Yet female breadwin­
ner couples neutralizing gender deviance by having wives perform an 
equal share of domestic tasks are more stable than traditional male bread­
winner couples in either country. 
These results suggest important extensions of our understanding of 
gender relations. First, the competing theories of effects of the household 
division of labor both hold true; which holds true depends upon the degree 
to which theorized dynamics are supported by institutional factors such 
as policies. This suggests that the slow evolution in the division of domestic 
tasks observed over the past half century may not result from persistent 
gender differences, but from continuing institutional reinforcement of the 
gendered division of labor (see also Breen and Cooke 2005). Change is 
not revolutionary as initially predicted by Hochschild (1989); policies af­
fect the progress of the evolution toward greater gender equity. 
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Second, where the evolution is not thwarted by policies reinforcing 
traditional gender hierarchies, men’s greater participation in domestic 
tasks results in more stable marriages regardless of women’s employment. 
This ﬁnding raises questions regarding the wisdom of calls from conser­
vative quarters to reinforce the traditional male breadwinner family to 
turn the tide of increasing family instability. Further, a gendered division 
of labor leaves women and their children economically vulnerable under 
macroeconomic conditions that are more volatile than those of the 1960s. 
For example, unemployment in West Germany was just 0.5% in 1965, 
rising during the 1980s and 1990s to 7% or 8% (OECD 1978, 2000). Most 
vulnerable during periods of high unemployment are persons with low 
skills and little experience, such as traditional housewives. Single female 
heads of household are more likely to be poor and reliant on state transfers 
(Daly and Rake 2003). Consequently, reinforcement of the male bread­
winner model appears of little beneﬁt to women, children, or the state. 
One might lament that U.S. female breadwinners must carry a one-
and-one-half burden of paid and unpaid labor to ensure marital stability. 
Women employed full-time, however, reduce their domestic hours, so such 
women’s greater domestic share is based upon fewer total housework 
hours to be divided between the wife and husband. In addition, we cannot 
tell with these data the extent to which performing the remaining house­
hold tasks represents an expression of love and caring rather than a burden 
(Ferree 1990). Future research needs to decipher, however, what U.S. 
husbands that contribute little to either paid or unpaid labor do contribute 
to marriage to make them more successful than traditional ones. 
More generally, the results shed no light on the process by which the 
household division of labor might lead to marital instability. Does the 
household division of labor alter marital quality, or do different divisions 
only alter the risk of divorce within unhappy marriages as found by 
Schoen and his colleagues (2002)? There is also a tacit assumption within 
both models that women initiate divorce, either because they no longer 
economically require men (specialization and trading model), or because 
men fail to take on more equitable divisions of domestic tasks (social 
exchange model). Given that different household divisions of labor appear 
optimal in different countries, our understanding of gender relations 
would deepen with exploration into which partner under what circum­
stances terminates the relationship under different policy conﬁgurations. 
We remain somewhat cautious in our conclusions, however, because 
even among the more recent group of ﬁrst-married couples analyzed here, 
female primary breadwinning couples are still outliers. Wives earned more 
than 75% of the income in only 13% of U.S. and 7% of West German 
couples in the sample. Still, the results highlight the idea that distributive 
justice prevails where gender hierarchies are not reinforced. Policy is 
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instrumental in setting gender hierarchies, with the evidence here indi­
cating that policy encouraging gender equity encourages family economic 
ﬂexibility and marital stability. In other words, gender equity represents 
more than a feminist ideal; it proves essential for sustaining healthy post­
industrial societies. Neither the United States nor Germany, however, has 
policy provisions actively supporting maternal employment and encour­
aging men’s participation in the domestic sphere, particularly in child 
care, such as those found in Scandinavian countries (Gauthier 2005; Gor­
nick and Meyers 2003). Future comparative research needs to look at the 
household divisions of labor and effects of these on family outcomes across 
a wider array of state, market, and gender relations. 
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